




Milorad Dodik’s Use of Contentious Rhetoric  
in (De)constructing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Identity: A Discourse-Historical Analysis1
Abstract: The article explores Milorad Dodik’s rhetoric and nationalist discourse in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It seeks to shed light on the intricacies of the politics of 
the current Serb member of the tripartite Presidency of BiH by analyzing a number of 
television interviews and the speeches Dodik delivered at the celebration of the RS Day 
on January 9, 2017–2020. Unfortunately, BiH continues its struggle with divisive iden-
tity politics, which perpetuates the nationalist paradigm of the nation. Identity politics 
plays an integral part in the construction of “we” versus “them,” and underlies the lack 
of a “national identity.” The analysis will reveal Dodik’s political strategies and offer a 
glimpse into his ideology and views of BiH as well as his vision and long-term objec-
tives for the Republika Srpska (RS). Moreover, the article examines linguistic practices 
and seeks to answer the following research questions: how does Dodik view BiH, and 
what are his long-term goals for RS? Has identity politics influenced the emergence of 
referendums in RS? What could the referendums proposed and already held in the RS 
mean for the future of BiH and its national identity?
Key words: referendum, national identity, identity politics, discourse-historical 
analysis, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik
Introduction
This paper examines the coherence of Dodik’s rhetoric about Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the Serb Republic (RS), his long-term 
goals, and the role the “Referendum on the Day of RS” has played and 
may play in the future. The aim of the paper is to analyze the content and 
qualities of Dodik’s rhetoric in light of his interviews and speeches at the 
celebration of RS Day from 2017 to 2020. The selected interviews and 
speeches will be further elucidated in the data section of the paper and 
1 The paper was written as part of the research project “Perspektivy evropské in-
tegrace v kontextu globální politiky II” at Masaryk University (MUNI/A/1044/2019).
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are meant to answer the following research questions: How does Dodik 
perceive BiH and what are his long-term goals for RS? Have identity 
politics influenced the emergence of referendums in the RS? What could 
proposed and already held referendums in the RS mean for the future of 
BiH and its national identity?
After serving his second term as the President of RS, Dodik ran for 
the Serbian seat of BiH’s tripartite presidency in the 2018 election and 
won. Dodik’s victory has further emboldened him to make questionable 
and unfettered rhetoric about BiH. He has openly argued for RS interests 
and independence, which has undermined BiH’s national identity and has 
brought the future of BiH into the question. Despite being one of the main 
antagonists of a united BiH, Dodik is now its representative.
Dodik has often described BiH as a burden with no future, “something 
we [Serbs] want to shake off our back” (Vujanovic, 2010). Moreover, 
Dodik stated, “our freedom is our country, and our country is RS” (In-
dexHr, 2018). According to Dodik, the new government can define the 
long-term status of RS. Thus, it is crucial to further explore the develop-
ment of Dodik’s political discourse.
The discourse-historical approach (DHA) is employed in the analy-
sis because it  incorporates different genres of discourse related to the 
issue. By focusing on the content, as one of the three dimensions of 
DHA, one can systematically portray the discursive construction of na-
tional identities, address the creation of nationalist ideology, the discur-
sive construction of a shared culture, the political present and future, and 
the national body, as well as describe and create its shared political past 
(Wodak, 2016). Moreover, DHA is meant to “trace the intertextual his-
tory of phrases and arguments” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 28). Special atten-
tion is given to the discursive construction and representation of “us” and 
“them.” Ciepley (2013) discusses the danger of political candidates using 
identity politics in multiethnic and multi-religious democracies as this 
can lead to “us” versus “them” (p. 137). Lastly, identity politics need to 
be taken into consideration.
A Brief Overview of BiH’s Political Set Up and Its Impact  
on Identity Formation
Ever since the breakup of Yugoslavia and BiH’s declaration of inde-
pendence, fragmented and unstable national and ethnic identities emerged 
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in BiH. Like Austria, which faced challenges with its national identity as 
the result of geopolitical transformation in 1989, BiH has been dealing 
with the dilemma of how to maintain and transform its national identity. 
Today, there still appears to be a struggle between the ethnic and national 
identities within BiH. The complex territorial and political structure of 
BiH requires us to look at the dimensions of the discursive construction 
of ethnic and national identities.2
BiH consists of two entities – the Federation of BiH (Federacija 
BiH, FBiH) and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska, RS) and, ad-
ditionally, the autonomous district of Brčko. The international com-
munity contributed to BiH’s status as a de	facto protectorate, known 
for its loose federation and weak central government (Bieber, 2006, 
p. 40). Its current political system was established by the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (DPA), which ended the war in 1995. While it 
stopped the war, the DPA also “institutionalized an ethno-territorial 
division of BiH organized around war territories, locking nationalist 
antagonism into the very structure of the state” (Toal, 2013, p. 199). 
Unfortunately, the ethno-territorial division could have attributed to 
the recreation of the hatreds (Holbrooke, 1999). According to Gromes 
(2010), “at least one party to the conflict rejected the concept that 
its own ethnic group would constitute a single sovereign political 
community together with its rivals. Consequently, the sense of being 
a common nation was missing” (p. 360). Moreover, Basseuner (2009) 
argues that the country’s constitution, the Annex IV of DPA, “gener-
ates new nationalists by making fear and ethnic divisiveness politi-
cally profitable” (p. 197).
Like in many war-stricken countries, BiH and its different ethnic 
groups have struggled to address the consequences of the war and agree 
on the narratives of the past. Unfortunately, this has impacted the creation 
of its national identity and left BiH in the hands of the political elite to 
portray the identity in a way that will further their own political agenda. 
Instead of framing a national identity, some political elites have concen-
trated on ethnic polarization instead. Thus, BiH is marred by weak insti-
tutions, as a result of ethnic politics, and its attempts to unify its citizens 
are derisory.
2 Wodak et al. (1999) developed a method of description and analysis to examine 
the discursive production of national identity by using an Austrian case study, which 
can be applied to other countries.
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Milorad Dodik, referendums, and their danger to BiH statehood
During his political career, which began in 1998, Dodik has undergone 
a political metamorphosis, drastically changing his political ideologies 
and political orientation. At first, Dodik presented himself as a moderate 
Bosnian Serb, a protagonist of Serb nationalist politics and a supporter of 
a pragmatic technocratic wing of politics. Dodik appeared to be commit-
ted to peace building, reconciliation, and national unity. While Washing-
ton and Brussels considered him the biggest political breakthrough since 
DPA, pro-Karadzic supporters inveighed against Dodik and viewed him 
as “a tool of the West who betrayed Serbs” (Jeffries, 2003, p. 28).
Between 2001 and 2005, Dodik and his political party, the Alliance of 
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), inordinately changed its political 
rhetoric. In 2005, during the negotiations on constitutional reform, it was 
revealed that SNSD envisioned BiH to resemble the former Yugoslavia, 
a federalized state with two or more entities/republics, which would have 
the right to self-determination. Dodik has managed to engineer the de	facto 
autonomy of the RS (Parish, 2011). Moreover, Dodik has begun stressing 
the Serb national identity and undermining the Bosnian national identity. 
He has portrayed Serbs as victims, often silenced and disrespected by local 
and international authorities. Thus, Dodik has emerged as the chief pro-
tagonist of Serb nationalist politics (Maksic, 2009, p. 6). As such, Dodik 
has become the main obstacle for BiH, as he thwarts reforms necessary for 
BiH’s state-building in its quest for NATO and EU membership.
Referendums may become Dodik’s main tool for strengthening his 
overall political power, while subverting the BiH’s state-building trajec-
tory. Talks about referendums might have been strategically used and ma-
nipulated by Dodik to garner legitimacy and improve his political stand-
ing, ultimately radicalizing the Bosnian political scene. While the crude 
application of the referendums, especially when used to settle territorial 
claims in such a complex multi-ethnic environment, may lead to precari-
ous and perilous results, Dodik argues that referendums represent a demo-
cratic act guaranteed by the UN convention. Instead of being a legitimate 
democratic procedure, though, a direct vote empowering the electorate to 
approve or dismiss a particular proposal makes referendums in BiH con-
tentious. Although the international community entreated Dodik to pull 
the plug on the referendum on RS Day, it was held and drew attention to 
BiH’s immense structural problems. According to Dodik, “We [Serbs] 
will not hesitate to hold a referendum in the future on various issues, 
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and therefore opponents believe that if this one is prevented, it would 
diminish the will of the Serbian people to fight further” (Alternativna TV, 
2016). Toal (2013) argues that Dodik’s rhetoric regarding the “referen-
dum” is understood as the referendum which will lead to RS’s secession 
from BiH. Dodik states, “Nobody can prevent us [Serbs] from holding 
a referendum. We never gave up on it, but everything has its time” (as 
cited in Barlovac, 2012). Many question whether this referendum could 
lead to others, including one about RS’s secession from BiH, since Dodik 
has reiterated on multiple occasions that RS will use referendums in the 
future to decide various issues.
Data selection and methods of analysis
The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), which represents one of 
many theoretical and methodological approaches in Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA), is used to analyze Dodik’s rhetoric. The approach was 
selected because of its level of research interest and methodological ori-
entation towards identity construction and unjustified discrimination, the 
historical dimension of discourse formation, as well as for addressing 
identity politics (national, local, transnational, and global) and the politics 
of the past. DHA is problem-oriented and, as such, it aims to clearly ad-
dress and analyze the complexity of the object/study under investigation. 
Thus, it integrates multiple approaches, incorporates different analytical 
perspectives, and utilizes various sources of data, making it interdisci-
plinary (Wodak, 2016). The researcher chooses the empirical data and 
sources most relevant to the problem in question (Wodak, 2009).
Wodak et al. (1999) discuss five major thematic areas of the discur-
sive construction of national identity and the linguistic construction of 
(1) a homogenized national figure/individual as well as construction of 
the “self” and “others”; (2) common history (i.e. myths, past events); 
(3) common culture (i.e. religion, art, etc.); (4) common political stand-
ing (i.e. current situation and future ambitions); and (5) national territory. 
However, not all of these areas will be covered in detail in this article. 
Detecting the macro-topics and other subtopics will help uncover the pur-
pose of a speech and determine what type of strategies and devices the 
speaker uses to accomplish the intended meaning with his/her speech.
By using DHA’s three-dimensionality (i.e. identification of specific 
contents/topics of a specific discourse, investigation of discursive strate-
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gies, and examination of linguistic means), the study defines the terms 
used, integrates available information with the historical background, and 
analyzes the coherence of the texts. Although the terms “ethnicity” and 
“nationality” have sometimes been used interchangeably in the context 
of the former Yugoslavia, for the purpose of this study, the author ap-
plies Majstorovic and Turjacanin’s (2012) definitions. The term “ethnic” 
is used when identifying Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks while the term “na-
tional” is used with regards to state-related [BiH] identity. In addition, the 
author uses Wodak’s (1999) definition of national identity, which states 
that “national identity is the product of discourse” (pp. 44–45).
According to Wodak, (1) nations are mainly mental constructs; (2) na-
tional identity consists of “a set of dispositions, attitudes and conventions 
that are largely internalized through socialization and create a national 
habitus;” and (3) nationhood represents a configuration of social identity, 
which can be “produced, transformed, maintained and dismantled through 
discourse” (Wodak, 2016, p. 8; Wodak et al., 2009, pp. 3–4). Wodak at al. 
(2009, p. 189) argue that the construction of a common culture as well as 
a “national character” is crucial in the discourses of national identity, as 
it adds value to the other “common” elements (i.e. past, present, future, 
territory, etc.). Selected definitions explain how individuals may relate 
to, believe in, and identify with the envisioned image of the imagined na-
tion, which can be observed in the discourse and construction of Dodik’s 
narratives of RS discourse culture, lack of desire for national [BiH] unity 
and absence of emotional connection with BiH as a state. Lastly, earlier 
research on national identity revealed that the way the political elites con-
strued identity differed from how it was construed in everyday life (as 
cited in Majstorovic and Turjacanin, 2012, p. 40).
According to Wodak (2001), four types of discursive macro-strate-
gies need to be applied in discourses about nations and national identi-
ties: constructive strategies; strategies of perpetuation and justification; 
transformation strategies; and destructive strategies. These strategies are 
a “more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practic-
es) adopted to achieve a particular social, psychological or linguistic aim” 
(Wodak, 2001, p. 73). Each of these strategies has different objectives 
and by identifying them in the analysis, one gains a better understanding 
about identity formation and division between social groups (De Cillia et 
al., 1999; Wodak et al., 1999).
As stated by van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), social actors use dis-
course to constitute information, situations, social roles, identities and 
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interpersonal relations between different social groups. Their discursive 
acts play a critical part in the genesis, the production and construction of 
social conditions, national identities and/or groups of people (e.g. Serbian 
versus Bosnian, Serbs versus Bosniaks, Serbs versus international com-
munity). Moreover, these discursive acts are used to validate, reproduce, 
transform or eliminate the status	quo (e.g. interpretation of DPA, interna-
tional influence, etc.).
Reisigl and Wodak (2001) provide five discursive strategies which are 
all embroiled in the positive self- and negative other-presentation, and 
can assist in the analysis of discourses about racial, national and ethnic 
issues. They are strategies of reference/nomination (used to construct and 
represent social actors/in-groups and out-groups); predication (used to la-
bel social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or ap-
preciatively); argumentation (using topoi to justify positive and negative 
attributions); perspectivation, framing or discourse representation (used 
by speakers to address their involvement and point of view); and intensi-
fication and mitigation (used to qualify and adjust the epistemic status of 
a proposition) (pp. 44–47).
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) emphasize the significance of the 
speeches of the political elite/presidents because they often tend to expli-
cate the creation of either ethnic or national identity. Throughout his polit-
ical career, Dodik has used public appearances, speeches, and interviews 
to run the gamut of political topics and convey messages to his constitu-
ents, supporters and opponents. He has demonstrated his ability to tailor 
his speeches to his audiences, either escalating or de-escalating his na-
tionalistic views. Dodik’s political rhetoric has been examined over time 
with special emphasis on the period between 2016 and 2020, as this time 
frame offers insight into the latest political agenda and ideas Dodik has 
endorsed. During this time the first referendum took place and Dodik’s 
talk about future referendums, including the one on secession, intensified.
Dodik incorporates identity politics in his speeches. Thus, the author 
uses Benhabib’s definition of identity politics, which states that “identity 
politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference” 
(1997, p. 28). The danger lies in the atavistic belief that one must elimi-
nate difference and otherness in order to sustain and safeguard one’s own 
identity. This leads to stereotypes and dichotomies about ethnic groups 
and results in the “us” versus “them” dichotomy.
This study consists of an analysis of three interviews with Milorad 
Dodik and four of his speeches. The selected interviews address Dodik’s 
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views on BiH and its future, the involvement of the international com-
munity, referendums, and secession. They were conducted after the refer-
endum, after the celebration of RS Day, both before and after his election, 
and by a variety of journalists, both domestic and international – Senad 
Hadzifejzovic (Centralni Dnevnik – CD, BiH), Zorica Ilic and Bahri Cena 
(Deutsche Welle – DW, Germany), and Milomir Maric (Cirilica, Serbia). 
The selected speeches were given at the celebration of RS Day in 2017, 
2018, 2019, and 2020.
Dodik’s rhetoric on Bosnia and Herzegovina
Dodik’s rhetoric has drastically changed during the period of 1997–
1999 and 2000-present. Unlike his current opinion of BiH, in 1997, Dodik 
supported the concept of a united BiH stating, “It’s better to be an entity in 
BiH, than a province in Serbia” (as cited in Slobodna Bosna, 2016). More-
over, Dodik believed that “the Dayton-built BiH, gives a better chance for 
their [Serbs’] development than if they were part of Serbia, which some 
nationalists hope to see” (as cited in BN, 2016). As his political rhetoric 
shifted, Dodik began to equivocate and prevaricate when speaking about 
BiH. Lately, Dodik’s rhetoric on BiH has become more hardline, divisive 
and ethno-nationalist. Dodik focuses primarily on Serbs’ national politics 
and their identity. He has never promulgated a BiH identity while he has 
worked tirelessly for the RS. Dodik argues that the DPA created a union 
of two state-like entities that have precedence over BiH, which itself was 
not defined as a “state,” just given the name BiH (RS Day, 2017). This 
description of BiH makes it look as if BiH has the setup of the former 
Yugoslavia. Thus, Dodik does not talk about the BiH’s national identity; 
instead, he discusses the RS’s identity.
Analysis of Dodik’s rhetoric reveals the use of four types of discur-
sive macro-strategies. First, Dodik uses constructive strategies to estab-
lish a specific national identity, which can be argued to be the “Serbian” 
identity. Dodik openly identifies as a Serb from Banja Luka, RS, and if 
asked for further identification, he has declared himself as a Serb from 
Belgrade [Serbia] (Ivanji, 2009). During his interview with Maric, Dodik 
declared: “I am not a member of this Bosnian state and I do not identify 
with it. I am a member of the Serbian people and I have the citizenship 
of RS and Serbia. I only have a formal citizenship in BiH, but it does not 
give me any pleasure” (Cirilica, 2018). Dodik does not identify as a Bos-
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nian and refers to it as an imposed identity and label. Dodik often uses 
the discursive construction of “we”/“us” [Serbs], and “them” [Bosniaks 
and the international community led by the U.S. and Great Britain]. By 
using the pronoun “we” together with a specific group, Dodik creates 
a national “we-group” and associates it with the toponymical label, which 
in this case is “The Serbs.” Moreover, Dodik uses “we” as a linguistic 
tool to separate himself and Serbs (“we”) from others. Thus, Dodik clear-
ly defines and restricts “we” to Serbs living in the RS, as well as Serbs 
in Serbia. He uses ethnic polarization in his attempt to frame and foster 
the “Serb” identity. Moreover, by stressing the importance of unity and 
working together, while also emphasizing the difference between ethnic 
groups, Dodik is able to appeal to a group of people [Serbs] and form an 
in-group, which results in the sense of solidarity and togetherness of the 
“we-group.” Unfortunately, this leads to the marginalization of “others” 
[non-Serbs]. During the interview with Hadzifejzovic, Dodik referred to 
Bakir Izetbegovic, a former Bosniak member of the tripartite presidency, 
as Hadzifejzovic’s president, to which the host responded, “you [Dodik] 
are mine, he [Izetbegovic] is yours, and we are ours.” Dodik replied, 
“We are neither ours nor yours, we have a clear position in society” (CD, 
2016). This shows that Dodik does not want to be associated with people 
from the FBiH and that they do not belong to his “we” group. The strategy 
of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation is also ap-
plied, which often has no explicit referent (De Cillia et al., 1999, p. 163). 
Dodik’s construction of the Serbs’ unity and collective past, which he 
describes as the Serbs’ struggle for freedom, their immense sacrifices, and 
perseverance, not only serves as the positive self-presentation of Serbs 
but also of Dodik himself. He stated, “I am proud to have lived in a time 
of its [RS’] creation and its defense. I have tried to do what was the best 
for my people [Serbs] without hurting others” (RS Day, 2020).
Dodik uses the strategies of perpetuation and justification to highlight 
the idea of continuity and maintaining Serb identity, which he perceives 
to be threatened. Moreover, he uses these strategies to defend RS’s com-
plex historical narrative. Dodik references the Serbs’ past suffering dur-
ing the First and Second World Wars, and insists that Serbs need their 
own country because “[w]hen we [Serbs] did not have a state, we were 
killed.” According to him, the RS exists to ensure history does not repeat 
itself. Dodik calls the last century “the century of Serb suffering” (RS 
Day, 2017). Thus, he wants this century to be the century of integration 
and state-building. Dodik emphasizes a common history and uses collec-
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tive memory to create a connection with his constituents and followers. 
In addition, he applies the strategy of avoidance by using euphemisms. 
Dodik had previously referred to the Srebrenica incident as “genocide,” 
but he repudiates this now, and calls Srebrenica “a serious ploy by Bos-
niaks and some members of the international community” (Srna, 2020). 
He justifies Serb actions by recalling atrocities committed against Serbs 
for which no one was prosecuted.
Dodik employs the strategies of transformation to discursively modify 
the meaning of a relatively well-established aspect of national identity 
into a different one, by using persuasion and argumentation schemes and 
topoi. The topoi, which are presented as conditional or causal paraphrases 
(i.e. “if x, then y” or “y because x”), can be observed in the discourse 
about the referendum (y), which Dodik claims was a response, a reac-
tion to Izetbegovic’s politics and abuse of power (x). Dodik states that 
Izetbegovic “assumed that he could, through foreigners, now the courts, 
create the reality for RS” (CD, 2016). In addition, Dodik uses the topos of 
comparison between two entities to build rapport and establish credibility 
among the masses. According to Dodik, the FBiH does not function at 
all, nor does BiH. Thus, they weigh down RS. Dodik argues, “RS is the 
only sustainable community in BiH, in an economic, political, and every 
other sense” (as cited in Weber, 2015, p. 3). The use of topos of threat is 
observed in Dodik’s rhetoric about perceived attempts by Bosniaks and 
the international community to endanger and undermine Serbs’ national 
identity and demolish RS. Dodik states, “the fight for the RS is not over, 
since attacks on RS’s rights (which were determined by the international 
DPA), its institutions and its holidays have not stopped” (RS Day, 2018).
Lastly, Dodik applies destructive strategies to target and destroy ex-
isting national identities or elements of them. Dodik declares, “we [RS 
Serbs] are not Bosnian Serbs, we are Serbs, part of a single nation, with 
one language and culture” (RS Day, 2018). Dodik claims that it would 
be “best for Bosniaks if we [RS and FBiH] all went separate ways, had 
good neighborly relations where no one would interfere in each other’s 
matters” (CD, 2016). This is a rare occasion when Dodik refers to both 
entities/ethnic groups as “we” but his ultimate goal is to break this “we,” 
which would be the end of BiH as a country. When asked whether BiH 
will survive in the current condition, Dodik answered, “no, not in any 
condition” (DW, 2017).
The selected interviews portray Dodik’s varying views of BiH. During 
the interview with Hadzifejzovic in 2016, Dodik appeared positive and 
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claimed he was for a “viable” BiH. However, Dodik’s rhetoric signifi-
cantly changed during the interview with Ilic and Bahri in 2017, when 
Dodik made several bellicose statements, including blatantly calling BiH 
a “failed state.” He galvanized interviewers by redrawing borders on the 
map, uniting RS with Serbia, and dividing the rest of BiH into Bosnian 
and Croat parts. Although Dodik is known for being a political firebrand 
who flirted with RS secession before, this was the most egregious act 
Dodik perpetrated during the interview. Lastly, Dodik angrily talked 
about BiH with Maric stating, “I do not love it [BiH]; I think it is a mis-
take, a historical one. It cannot exist” (Cirilica, 2018). However, what sets 
this interview apart from the others is Dodik’s tendency to keep referring 
to the suffering of Serbs during the First and Second World Wars and 
his contempt for the international community. Moreover, Dodik stressed 
religious differences, accusing Bosniaks of terrorism and Great Britain 
of working against RS and helping BiH become a centralized state. The 
discourse of difference, used to portray differences between two entities 
and ethnic groups in BiH, as well as similarities with Serbia is overem-
phasized.
Discussion on the results of the analysis: prevailing topics  
and their interdiscursivity
The present study shows the importance of analyzing Dodik’s rheto-
ric in order to better understand his political agenda and ideology and 
how he uses identity politics to achieve his goals. As Wodak (2016) 
points out, discourses are open and hybrid in nature. Thus, when analyz-
ing Dodik’s rhetoric about BiH and its future, other subtopics emerged 
which showed interdiscursivity between different discourses. For ex-
ample, the discourse on the RS Day referendum also referred to topics 
of other discourses (e.g. secession, NATO and EU integration, the view 
of the international community, etc.). Thus, it is helpful to delve deeper 
into those topics.
The referendum on the national holiday of RS, January 9
Referendums often originate in conscious political decisions made 
by a party, an organization, or a group (LeDuc, 2000, p. 5). In Janu-
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ary 2010, the RS Assembly adopted a new constitutional law on hold-
ing referendums (Toal, 2013, p. 168). Dodik has advocated for vari-
ous referendums since 2003 (e.g. referendums on defense reform, 
police reform, NATO membership, the OHR’s decision regarding the 
mandates of foreign judges and prosecutors) (Toal and Maksic, 2011, 
pp. 279–293). Dodik pushed for a referendum on RS Day and justified it 
as a legitimate political discourse, an answer and reaction to unsuccess-
ful constitutional changes.
By holding the referendum on September 25, 2016, the RS defied the 
Constitutional Court of BiH, which declared the holiday unconstitutional 
after reviewing the claim and stated that “each determination of holidays 
of an entity which symbolizes only one or only two of the three constitu-
ent peoples in BiH represents a measure which leads to division, exclu-
sion, limitation or favoritism based on national or ethnic heritage” (Sluz-
beni Glasnik, 2015, p. 114). In addition, since the holiday coincides with 
a Serbian Orthodox religious holiday, it discriminates against people of 
other ethnic and religious backgrounds.
The referendum highlighted BiH’s ongoing political paralysis and the 
weakness, inability, and reluctance of both the state and international com-
munity to prevent it. This may embolden Dodik to use referendums in the 
future to defy BiH’s laws and the international community. He described 
the referendum as a magnificent victory that demonstrated Serb energy 
to everyone, and their ability to organize themselves. Dodik stressed that 
the referendum represents the rights of the RS and was a tool to defend 
Serb rights and freedom. He stated, “the people need to get used to going 
to referendums. If we had not had the referendum, we would have been 
perceived as weak; the referendum makes us appear stronger and more 
important... The referendum is the expression of our commitment; it is 
very legitimate and fair” (Alternativna TV, 2016).
Although Dodik maintained that the referendum was not about sta-
tus or secession, he implied that the question of RS status might not 
be off the table in the future (Slobodna Evropa, 2016). According to 
Dodik, “no body, no institution in the RS, has an independence ref-
erendum on its agenda” (DW, 2017). However, he “dreams about it 
[independence]” (DW, 2017). Dodik states that the right to referendum, 
as a reflection of “national sovereignty,” cannot be denied to “them” 
[Serbs]. Once again, Dodik uses constructive strategies (national iden-
tity, “us” vs. “them”) together with the strategies of perpetuation and 
justification in order to stress the importance of referendums for RS. 
ŚSP 3 ’20	 Milorad	Dodik’s	Use	of	Contentious	Rhetoric...	 125
Referendums may have become Dodik’s latest tool in the fray for RS’s 
secession.
Secession
The referendum on January 9, RS Day, had a deeper meaning than just 
being about a national holiday, because on January 9, 1992, the Bosnian 
Serb Assembly proclaimed the Serbian Republic of BiH, which was later 
renamed RS. Thus, the referendum was entwined with a discourse on RS 
secession, independence and its national identity. When asked whether 
the map of the Balkans will look the same in ten years, Dodik quickly 
redrew the borders, joining RS and the northern part of Kosovo with Ser-
bia. He stated, “[t]his is very nice. Here would be that, what you call it... 
Bosnia, and here would be Herceg-Bosna,” for which, Dodik said “let it 
[Herceg-Bosna] stay alone. We will also remain independent; we [RS] 
have no intention of abolishing ourselves and joining Serbia. RS will re-
main – like Vojvodina, so RS can do it as well” (DW, 2017). While this 
statement at first seems contradictory to Dodik’s rhetoric about uniting 
RS with Serbia, this statement shows that he has considered RS having 
the same status as Vojvodina, which would still allow him to keep a high 
ranking political position. In the interview with Hadzifejzovic in 2016, 
Dodik said that he “might” be the president of RS again in the future.
Dodik argues that “[t]hey [Bosniaks and the members of international 
community] forbid us [Serbs] to dream, to live, to have a republic, and 
we [Serbs] tell them, we will live, we will dream, and we will become 
what we want.” He further adds, “[w]e dream to be united with mother-
land Serbia” (RS Day, 2017). Dodik portrays Serbs as oppressed people 
in BiH, entitled to self-determination. According to Dodik, “[t]he Serbs 
today have two states. One is Serbia and the other is RS. Although oth-
ers deny it, today we live in our own state. We see RS as our own state” 
(RS Day, 2020). He argues that, in order for RS to be able to secede from 
BiH, it needs a political framework which would be accepted by “some” 
(assumed to be countries that might support RS secession). Dodik further 
elaborates by stating that RS has been placed on the geographical and po-
litical maps of the world. In his speeches, Dodik references RS’s people, 
territory, institutions, rule of law, common culture, language and history. 
Hence, if RS is to be recognized as a state, Dodik knows it also needs 
sovereignty.
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Dodik’s relations with the “international community,”  
Serbia and Russia
Dodik’s rhetoric on the international community is constructed in an-
tagonistic relation to RS and the Serbs. He refers to the international com-
munity (i.e. the U.S., the EU, and Great Britain) as “a deceitful partner 
because everything has been created to the detriment of the RS” (Vecernji 
list, 2017). Not only did Dodik begin using the “us-versus-them” deixis 
when talking about other ethnic groups in BiH, but also when referring to 
some members of the international community.
Dodik has expressed the danger for Serbs from what he calls the Bos-
niak - Office of the High Representative (OHR) dictatorship stating, “I can 
and will talk, but cannot and will not just listen and nod my head” (as cit-
ed in Toal, 2013, p. 178). He claims that the international community has 
blacklisted Serbs and has worked on weakening the RS by having a closer 
relationship with Bosnians and stealthily transforming BiH into a central-
ized state. Moreover, Dodik accused the foreign judges from the Constitu-
tion Court of making political decisions together with Bosnians to the RS’s 
detriment. Thus, Dodik tells Serbs they need to be able to respond to any 
future attacks and defend themselves and their rights (RS Day, 2017).
On the other hand, Dodik has continued to act in concert with Serbia 
and Russia. Dodik claims that apart from Serbs who live in the RS, only 
Serbia and “friendly” Russia wanted the RS to exist, while many from the 
West did not (RS Day, 2020). Dodik justifies RS’s close relationship with 
Serbia by citing DPA’s Article III, which states that “the Entities shall have 
the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighboring states 
consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH” (U.S. De-
partment of State, 1995). During his speech on the RS Day in 2017, Dodik 
expressed his gratitude to Serbia and stated, “our [Serbs’] dream is to have 
an even closer bond between RS and Republic of Serbia.” Later, Dodik 
stated, “Serbian people are unique and indivisible in national, linguistic and 
cultural terms… Serbia is our foundation and our love for it [Serbia] should 
not bother anyone.” Dodik added, “the Serb people have two states – Serbia 
and RS – and we want to be one” (RS Day 2018). This statement can be 
considered a threat to BiH’s territorial integrity. Dodik pledged his alle-
giance to Serbia, not BiH and ended his speech with: “Happy RS Day, long 
live RS, long live Serbia and all Serbian people and all citizens of RS” (RS 
Day, 2018). In 2020, Dodik excluded the non-Serb population of RS in his 
address by saying “Long live RS. Long live Serbia and all Serbs wherever 
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they are” (RS Day, 2020). In addition, Dodik stressed the importance of the 
Declaration on the Unity of the Serbian people as a single national frame-
work since “Serbia is the epicenter of all our thoughts, all of our desires” 
(Cirilica, 2018). After winning the election in 2018, Dodik showed no inter-
est in political solidarity with the other two members of BiH’s presidency. 
Instead, Dodik discussed future cooperation with Serbia and his plans to 
meet with the president of Serbia before meeting with the other members 
of BiH’s presidency.
Dodik praises Russia for its friendship and economic cooperation with 
RS. He portrays Russia as RS’s guardian, since it vetoed the UN Security 
Council resolution that was to confirm the Hague’s ruling on Srebrenica as 
genocide. One can argue that there is a quid	pro	quo built into the Russia-
RS relationship: the quid of Russia’s support for RS’s future plans and veto 
at the UN Security Council for the quo of exerting its own influence in the 
region over the West, and stalling NATO and EU enlargement. Although 
Dodik denies it, Russia may exert considerable influence on his and RS’s 
political agenda. Thus, Dodik’s goal might be to stymie BiH’s progress to-
wards NATO and EU integration and instead move closer to Russia.
Conclusion
In the present study, the DHA approach has uncovered the identity 
formation of democratic antagonism. BiH, with its complicated institu-
tional set up and the political system that appears to be an ethno-national 
system, allows political elites with different aspirations to maintain power 
by using nationalist rhetoric. The article examined Dodik’s intermediate 
language in order to uncover the broader sociopolitical and historical con-
text of the emerging topics. The selected interviews and formal speech-
es were used to examine the coherence of Dodik’s rhetoric in emerging 
topics. Dodik’s rhetoric, message and intensity varied, depended on the 
interviewers and changed over time. For example, Dodik claimed that 
“we [Serbs] do not have a hidden agenda… Serbs do not have long term 
goals” (DW, 2018). One could argue that Dodik has long term goals (i.e. 
secession from BiH and unification with Serbia). Dodik’s rhetoric and 
actions have become more direct and audacious, especially since his be-
coming a member of the tripartite presidency of BiH in 2018.
Milorad Dodik has dominated the RS political scene. He uses rhe-
torical gambits and engages in identity politics to appeal to Serbs, the 
128	 Nađa	Beglerović	 ŚSP 3 ’20
preponderant ethnic group in the RS, against other [non-Serbs] groups. 
The analysis of Dodik’s discourse revealed Dodik’s self-contradictions 
and inconsistencies, as well as his ability to consistently use a variety 
of strategies when speaking about the RS, its identity and how it relates 
to BiH. Moreover, the analysis revealed the populist and manipulative 
nature of his discursive practices. He uses insinuations, allusions, and 
trivializing comparisons. The context of Dodik’s discourses was looked 
at from an intertextual and interdiscursive perspective. Intertextuality 
detected Dodik’s conflicting statements, while interdiscursivity showed 
that discourse on the referendum regarding January 9, RS Day, was inter-
twined with the discourse on secession, independence, national identity, 
and the international community’s role and involvement in BiH.
According to Dodik, he supports the idea of a constitutional BiH as 
outlined in Dayton, not the one the international community has been trying 
to create and force on Serbs. However, Dodik has defied the international 
community, and has been advocating for RS secession from BiH. Dodik 
has vaguely stated he has been working on creating a political environment 
conducive to RS secession from BiH. Dodik sounds unrepentant when re-
ferring to BiH as a failed and unviable country. In his speeches, Dodik 
references his pride towards the RS and Serbs, their struggles, survival and 
freedom, and the need for their own country and/or unification with Serbia. 
Dodik describes Serbs as peaceful people who do not want to hurt anyone, 
but who want their own country which will welcome all people, not just 
Serbs. However, this would mean splitting BiH, a country that already wel-
comes all of its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity or religion. He states, 
“BiH is not our wish. It is our coercion [by the international community]” 
(RS Day, 2019). With his rhetoric, Dodik not only portrays his vision and 
construction of the RS and Serb identity, he also emphasizes his antagonis-
tic relationship with some members of the international community.
During the interviews, and in his speeches at the celebrations of RS 
Day, Dodik used the “us” versus “them” deixis and differentiated between 
the identities of RS and BiH. In terms of common history and culture, 
Dodik associates more with Serbia rather than BiH, which leads to the de-
bate about “national territory” and his desire to merge RS and Serbia. By 
making this statement, Dodik marginalizes non-Serbs as outsiders who 
may struggle with the sense of belonging, as their identity is being closely 
tied to imposed and overemphasized ethnic and religious labels. Dodik’s 
rhetoric poses a real danger and may threaten BiH’s sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity, as he may still plan the RS secession and unification of all 
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Serbs in one country. He instrumentalizes the past, or his version of it, to 
portray national victimization, which might serve as a pretext for a politi-
cal or armed attack on the “other.” Dodik plays the ethnic/religious card 
and tries to rekindle forgotten, or create non-existent grievances. Dodik’s 
rhetoric, more nationalistic by the day, exposes him as a bulwark against 
a united BiH. Dodik may not be willing to forswear brinkmanship, which, 
although a gamble, has turned out to be beneficial for him in the past.
After becoming the Serb member of the tripartite presidency of BiH, 
Dodik stated, “I don’t care who the other two representatives in the presi-
dency are. I am going there, to this presidency, to work above all and only for 
the interests of Serbs” (Lakic, 2018). Dodik has done exactly that thus far, 
going as far as withdrawing the RS representatives from state institutions, 
blocking decisions, and causing institutional paralysis. His intransigence 
may further impede its central institutions and draw BiH into a political 
quagmire, making it easier for RS to secede (DW, 2017). Dodik may fili-
buster to prevent BiH’s accession to NATO and EU, which would hold BiH 
back from progressing into a stable democracy. He promises to continue to 
fight for Serb rights and retrieve what was taken from Serbs using political 
tools (RS Day, 2020). Moreover, Dodik may have other esoteric and poten-
tially insidious plans for BiH, including the secession of RS. Dodik called 
for a referendum for the umpteenth time, but this would be a referendum on 
secession with the slogan “Goodbye BiH, welcome RS-exit.” Unfortunately, 
one can argue the plan for the RS-exit has already been put in motion, since 
Dodik’s rhetoric no longer disavows irredentist aspiration. Thus, BiH’s fu-
ture may be replete with Dodik’s further attempts to undermine BiH’s terri-
torial integrity, canvass greater autonomy for the RS, weaken BiH’s already 
fragile democracy and stall the Euro-Atlantic integrations.
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Kontrowersyjna retoryka Milorada Dodika w (de)konstrukcji tożsamości 
Bośni i Hercegowiny. Analiza historyczno-dyskursywna 
 
Streszczenie
Ten artykuł bada dyskurs polityczny Milorada Dodika, obecnego serbskiego 
członka trójstronnej prezydencji w Bośni i Hercegowinie (BiH), i zwraca uwagę 
na zawiłości jego polityki. Analizuje szereg wywiadów telewizyjnych z Miloradem 
Dodikiem i przemówienia, które wygłosił podczas uroczystości 9 stycznia 2017 r. 
Niestety, BiH nadal zmaga się z dzielącą polityką tożsamości, która utrwala nacjonali-
styczny paradygmat narodu. Polityka tożsamości odgrywa integralną rolę w konstru-
owaniu „my” kontra „oni” i leży u podstaw braku „tożsamości narodowej”. Analiza 
ujawnia strategie polityczne Dodika i zwraca uwagę na jego ideologię i poglądy na 
BiH, a także na jego wizję i długoterminowe cele dla RS. Nadto, ujawnia polityczny 
cel tych wywiadów i przemówień. Artykuł analizuje praktyki językowe i stara się od-
powiedzieć na następujące pytania badawcze: Jak Dodik postrzega BiH i jakie są jego 
długoterminowe cele w RS? Czy polityka tożsamości wpłynęła na przeprowadzenie 
referendów w RS? Jaki wpływ na przyszłość BiH i jej tożsamość narodową mogą 
mieć zaproponowane i przeprowadzone referenda?
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